By Dr. Ajay Kumar Pandey
Hardly a week passes in my chambers without a client insisting that a property is “ancestral” and that they hold a guaranteed share in it simply because it came from their grandfather. This belief is old, widespread, and many times, entirely incorrect. It has not reflected the actual law since the Hindu Succession Act came into force on 17 June 1956.
The Supreme Court of India has now reiterated this reality in terms that leave little room for argument. In J. Rajesh (Minor) through his mother v. M. Kumaran (Dead) through LRs (2026 INSC 1208, decided on 6 November 2026), Justice Augustine George Masih and Justice Sunita Agarwal definitively dismissed a grandson’s claim to half of a plot that his father had received in a family partition and subsequently sold.
The Facts of the Case
N. Ramakrishnan owned property in Chennai and died intestate (without a will). Under the 1956 Act, his estate devolved to his heirs. His daughter filed a partition suit in 1993, and they agreed on a compromise decree in February 1994, which allotted 1,811 sq. ft. to his son.
The son’s child (the appellant) was born just a month earlier, in January 1994. In April 1997, the father sold his allotted plot to two buyers.
They subsequently filed a suit in the minor grandson’s name. The core argument was that the land was ancestral coparcenary property, that the grandson became a coparcener by birth, and that his father lacked the legal authority to sell it without “legal necessity.” He demanded partition and half of the land. The father did not defend the suit, prompting the purchasers to call the litigation collusive.
While the City Civil Court initially ruled in the grandson’s favor, the decision was reversed on appeal. The Madras High Court ruled against him in 2010, and nearly three decades after the original sale, his appeal to the Supreme Court has officially failed.
Notably, the original plaint only asked for partition and possession of a half share; it never explicitly sought to set aside the compromise decree or the sale deeds. That glaring omission alone should have troubled anyone advising the plaintiff.
The Ruling
The Court’s reasoning is sharp and instructive. When a Hindu male dies intestate after 1956, his property passes to his Class I heirs under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. They take this property as tenants in common, not as a joint family. Once they partition the estate, the son receives his share as his absolute individual property. He holds it in his individual capacity-not as a karta (manager of a joint family)-and his son acquires no interest in it by birth.
The Bench described Section 8 as a self-contained scheme of devolution. In the Act’s Schedule, a “son’s son” only appears as an heir if his own father has died before the original owner (the propositus). The 1956 Act deliberately did not preserve the old Mitakshara right of a grandson to claim a share during his living father’s lifetime, and the Court firmly declined to read that right back into the law.
How the Law Came to This
Under classical Mitakshara law, a son, grandson, and great-grandson each acquired an interest by birth in property inherited from their paternal ancestors. This interest was immediate and did not depend on anyone dying.
Section 8 altered this for property passing by succession. A clear line of Supreme Court precedent-from Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Chander Sen (1986) to Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar (1987) and Uttam v. Saubhag Singh (2016)-has consistently held that what a son inherits from his father under Section 8 is his individual property, not joint family property. J. Rajesh applies this established authority to the most common real estate scenario: an estate that is inherited, divided, and then sold.
Where a Grandson Still Has a Claim
This judgment does not strip grandsons of all rights. The ruling turns on its specific facts, and three distinct classes of cases remain exceptions:
- Pre-existing Coparcenaries: If the property was already a coparcenary in the grandfather’s hands during his lifetime, his son and grandson were coparceners by birth. On his death, only his undivided interest passes by succession. The coparcenary continues among the survivors, and any subsequently born son enters it.
- Succession Opened Before 1956: Property that passed under the old law (prior to 17 June 1956) retains its coparcenary character for the next generation. As seen in Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur (2020), pinpointing the exact date of each death is the crucial first step in any title chain.
- Daughters as Coparceners: Section 6, substituted in 2005, makes a coparcener’s daughter a coparcener by birth in her own right. Following Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020), this right applies regardless of whether her father was alive on 9 September 2005.
Working Out a Share
When a coparcener dies after the 2005 amendment, Section 6(3) dictates that his interest passes by will or intestate succession, not by survivorship. This interest is determined through a notional partition assumed to have occurred just before his death.
Consider a coparcenary of a father, son, and daughter. Upon a notional partition, each takes one-third. The father’s one-third then devolves equally to his Class I heirs (e.g., widow, son, daughter, mother), meaning one-twelfth each.
Consequently, the son and daughter each hold five-twelfths (their original third plus the inherited twelfth), while the widow and mother hold one-twelfth each. Branch must meticulously compute shares of the branch; a simple head count will almost always yield the wrong figure.
For Buyers and Lenders
This decision offers welcome relief to anyone purchasing a share allotted during a post-1956 partition. A seller’s children cannot emerge decades later to challenge the sale on the strength of a “birthright.” However, this protection relies entirely on the quality of the buyer’s due diligence. Before any money changes hands, ensure the following:
- Trace the Dates of Death: Trace the title back to the original owner, noting exactly when each holder died to determine whether the succession falls before or after 17 June 1956 and 9 September 2005.
- Verify Partition Documents: Obtain the partition deed or court decree. Make sure that someone has formally registered the deed.
- Check the Property’s Character: Find out whether the property was coparcenary in the original owner’s hands or self-acquired.
- Secure Clearances from All Heirs: Every Class I heir—including mothers and daughters—must either join the sale or execute a registered release deed. An oral consent from a co-sharer passes no legal title.
For lenders, a missing release deed from a married daughter remains one of the most common, and dangerous, defects in title reports on inherited property.
For Owners
A father holding property in his own right under Section 8 has absolute freedom to sell, gift, or bequeath it without seeking his children’s consent. Section 30 permits disposal by will, and its Explanation crucially extends that power to a coparcener’s undivided interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property-a detail frequently overlooked.
While a will does not strictly require registration, doing so is prudent. What matters most is valid execution under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act (attested by two witnesses) and avoiding any “suspicious circumstances” (such as a beneficiary actively drafting the will or the unexplained exclusion of a natural heir). A straightforward will, made in good health before independent witnesses, forestalls years of litigation.
Furthermore, families who have divided property informally must formalize it through a registered partition deed or a carefully drawn memorandum of family settlement. Oral partitions may be legally valid, but proving them twenty years later is a formidable challenge.
A Note for the Bar
A grandson’s suit for partition of property his father took under Section 8 may now invite a swift application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC for want of a cause of action.
Before filing such suits, counsel must be clear on when succession opened, the property’s original character, and whether any compromise decree or sale deed stands in the way. Order XXIII Rule 3A typically restricts a compromise decree to the court that recorded it, while challenging a sale deed requires a specific prayer for cancellation within the limitation period. The plaintiff in J. Rajesh failed on both fronts.
“Ancestral” is a word families use freely and emotionally. In modern property law, it carries far less weight. What truly decides a claim today is who held the property when they died, and the exact legal route by which it reached its present owner.
(The author is an Advocate practising before the Supreme Court of India and the High Courts, and Founder and Managing Partner of 4C Supreme Law International. Views are personal.)










